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2

REPLY BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT DAVID LEE BARRETT
STATEMENT OF CASE AND PROCEEDINGS
This case arose as Defendant was proceeding northbound on
Interstate

15

between

the

north

and

south

Nephi

exits.

Defendant's vehicle, and the vehicle preceding Defendant on the
roadway, were simultaneously pulled over by Utah Highway Patrol
Trooper Paul Mangelson who, although busy with another motorist
when Defendant passed, gave chase and stopped both vehicles for
allegedly speeding.

Trooper Mangelson made a consent search of

the first vehicle and found marijuana in the trunk.

He then

requested and was denied consent to search the Barrett vehicle,
reached into Barrett's car, took the keys, and effected a search
of the trunk discovering sealed luggage wherein marijuana was
discovered.
Prior to requesting consent to search and then conducting a
warrantless

and

nonconsentual

search,

the

police

officer

received and reviewed the registration documents for the Barrett
automobile.

The vehicle was improperly registered, which the

officer testified would justify his seizing and impounding the
car.

Notwithstanding

vehicle, the officer

the ability to seize and
conducted

impound the

his search without notifying

dispatch or requesting backup or making any other contact.
Defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained in the
search, on the grounds that probable cause was lacking, a search
warrant

was

circumstances
automobile.

available
existed

and

for

necessary,

the

and

warrantless

Defendant's Motion was denied

no

search
and

this

exigent
of

the

appeal

follows.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Defendant's
circumstances

issues

on

and probable

appeal

are

whether

cause were present

exigent

to justify a

warrantless search of Defendant's vehicle.
REPLY TO RESPONDENTS FACTS
Trooper Mangelson estimated the vehicles were "a couple of
hundred" feet apart when they were stopped.

(T.7)

exhibits

but

1,

2,

and

3,

(not

in

record,

Suppression
requested

in

Supplementary Record on Appeal attached hereto as exhibit 1) ,
clearly show the vehicles to be parked within 10 feet of each
other.

See also Barrett's testimony where he said the vehicles

2

were "very close," within 10 to 15 feet of each other.

(T. 51-

52)
Although Respondent states that trooper Mangelson testified
he did not open the garbage bag containing marijuana from the
front vehicle prior to his search of Defendant's vehicle (Br. of
Res. at 4), the following exchange took place at the suppression
hearing:
Q: Now as I understood the first thing you
did is you searched Mr. Sandiford's car?
A:

Yes, that is correct.

Q:

Opened the package, opened the trunk?

A:

Yes.

Q:
Opened the package in the trunk until
you got to the Marijuana?
A «

IcS • • • •

Q: And when you first approached David, the
defendant in this case, the Sandiford trunk
was opened and the Marijuana bag was open?
A:
I believe
remember....

it was... as far as I can

Q: And so there was some question in your
mind whether you were smelling that
Marijuana from Sandiford's car wasn't there?
A:

Well it entered my mind yes.

Q: And in effect it entered your mind to
the point where you represented that to Mr.
Barrett?
A:

I did yes. (T. 20-21).

3

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS LEGAL CONCLUSION THAT
EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES EXISTED JUSTIFYING A
WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S AUTOMOBILE.
Unsupported

by

any

factual discussion, the trial court

determined "exigent circumstances" existed which justified the
warrantless search of Defendant's vehicle.

This was based on

the Court's finding that "this is a vehicle on the highway that
could have easily been driven away should the officer leave or
the officer leave and attempt to make contact with the Justice
of the Peace to obtain a search warrant."
perfunctory

and

insufficient

finding

of

(T. 83)
fact

This

leaves

the

Appellate Court in a position to apply a "correction of error"
standard.
1989)

State v. Johnson, 771 P. 2d 326, 327 (Utah Court Ap.

(citations omitted).

The trial Court

failed to even

consider Defendant's two major points, that a telephonic (or
radio) search warrant was available to the officer, and that he
had a right to seize the automobile or arrest the Defendant,
thereby precluding movement of Defendant's automobile.

EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES WERE ARGUED AT THE TRIAL COURT:
Respondents
circumstances
automobile.

have

based

failed
on

They argue:

the

to

address

officer's

a

lack

right

to

of

exigent

seize

the

"Defendant further argues that because
4

the VIN

of

the

car

itself

did

not match

the VIN

on

its

registration, Trooper Mangelson could have seized and impounded
the car prior to his search.

However, Defendant did not make

this argument at the trial Court.

Therefore, an appellate Court

will not consider it on appeal." (Br. of Res. 12)
This is an absolute misstatement of the facts and issues
before the trial Court.

This issue of the VIN numbers and the

opportunity to seize the car pending a search warrant is briefed
at page three and page four of Defendant's Memorandum in Support
of his Motion to Suppress.
In

addition,

Defendant

argued

at

the

time

of

the

suppression hearing "I think that [Mangelson7s] testimony has
very clearly shown that a vehicle which is improperly licensed,
a vehicle which is suspected of being stolen is a vehicle which
is subject to

impound

and by being subject to impound the

exigent circumstances evaporate.
of the police.

The car is now under control

They now have an opportunity to obtain a search

warrant and search the automobile.

That is the issue before the

Court with regard to this evidence. (T. 44-45)

Therefore, the

issue is properly preserved for appellate review.

NO EXCEPTION TO WARRANT REQUIREMENTS WERE PRESENT:
In State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175 (Utah 1983), the Utah
Supreme

Court

outlined

the

exceptions
5

to

the

warrant

requirement.

Those exceptions are: (1) consent searches, (2)

searches and seizures made in hot pursuit, (3) searches and
seizures of contraband in public areas, (4) seizure of evidence
in

plain

view

after

a

lawful

intrusion,

(5) searches

and

seizures incident to lawful arrest under exigent circumstances,
and

(6) searches and

circumstances.

seizures of automobiles under

Id. at 179

No such exceptions were present in this case.
a consent search.
both

exigent

testified

This was not

The investigating officer and the Defendant

that

consent

was

denied.

Neither

do

the

specifics of exceptions 2, 3, 4, and 5 apply to this case.

The

investigating officer based his search under the exceptions of
number 6, searches and seizures of automobiles under exigent
circumstances.
This case is indistinguishable from Coolidae and Griffin.
The State has urged that this case is distinguishable from the
doctrine announced in Coolidae v. New Hampshire and State v.
Griffin.

In neither of those cases were the Carroll - Chambers

exigencies present.

Under such circumstances, the Supreme Court

appropriately found the automobile exception irrelevant.
In Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), on the basis of
information
occupants

provided

of

a

by witnesses

to an armed

station wagon were arrested

following the crime.

robbery, the

within

an hour

The station wagon was driven to the police
6

station, after which a thorough search of the car uncovered two
revolvers and other items which were admitted into evidence
against petitioner at his trial for two robberies.

The delayed

search of the car could not be upheld as incident to arrest, so
the Court quickly moved to the question of whether the search
could be justified under the Carroll

rule.

Carroll,
nor other cases in this Court
require or suggest that in every conceivable
circumstance the search of an auto even with
probable cause may be made without the extra
protection for privacy that a warrant
affords.
But the circumstances that
furnished probable cause to search a
particular auto for particular articles are
most often unforeseeable;
moreover, the
opportunity to search is fleeting since a
car is readily moveable.
Where this is
true, as in Carroll
and the case before us
now, if an effective search is to be made at
any time, either the search must be made
immediately without a warrant or the car
itself must be seized and held without a
warrant for whatever period is necessary to
obtain a warrant for the search.
Thus it can be seen that the automobile exception is based
upon a car being

readily moveable.

In the case of David

Barrett, his car was subject to immediate seizure and impound by
the police, as testified by the investigating police officer,
due to the fact that the serial number on the car did not match
the serial number on the registration.

(T. 27)

In this case, it should be noted that Defendant was subject
to arrest for committing a misdemeanor in the police officer's

7

presence (speeding, a Class B Misdemeanor)1, and the vehicle was
subject to impound for having improper registration.
Therefore,

none

of

the

Carroll

- Chambers

(T. 27)

exigencies

were

present in this case and the investigating police officer would
have had ample opportunity to obtain a search warrant.
When a warrantless search or seizure is challenged, it is
the State's burden to demonstrate the exigent
justifying it.
The

State

circumstances

United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951).

has

failed

to

show

any

exigent

circumstances

whatsoever in David Barrett's case.
CONTINUED SEARCH OF A SEALED CONTAINER:
The exigent circumstances doctrine set forth in Carroll

was

further defined and expanded in the case of Cardwell v. Lewis,
417 U.S. 483 (1974), wherein the Court stated that traditionally
"[o]ne has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle
because its function is transportation and it seldom serves as
ones residence or as the repository of personal effects."

The

same cannot be said of luggage found within an automobile.

The

United States Supreme Court in United States v. Chadwick, 433
U.S. 1 (1977), suppressed evidence found in a locked footlocker
taken from the trunk of Chadwick's automobile.

The Court held

in part that the government was in error in contending "that the
rationale
1

of

our

automobile

search

Utah Code Ann. §77-7-2 (1986)
8

cases

demonstrates

the

reasonableness permitting warrantless searches of luggage."

The

Court then concluded that the footlocker in this case was unlike
a vehicle in terms of either mobility or expectation of privacy:
The factors which diminish the privacy
aspects of an automobile do not apply to
respondent's footlocker.
Luggage contents
are not open to public view, except as a
condition to border entry or common carrier
travel; nor is luggage subject to regular
inspections and official scrutiny on a
continuing basis.
Unlike an automobile,
whose primary function is transportation,
luggage is intended as a repository of
personal effects.
In sum, a persons
expectations of privacy in personal luggage
are substantially greater than in an
automobile.
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 53 L.Ed.
2d 538 (1977).
In the case of David Barrett, as in the case of Chadwick,
"there was not the slightest danger that the footlocker or its
contents could of been removed before a valid search warrant
could be obtained," and precisely the same is true of the sealed
container in the Barrett vehicle.
It was previously argued to the trial Court (T. 68-69) that
absent exigent circumstances, the police must obtain a warrant
before searching a closed container found in a vehicle even if
they have probably
contraband.
Supreme

cause to believe the container

contains

State v. Turget, (Ore.); Robins v. California, 101

Court

2841; Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 99

Supreme Court 2586; United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 97

Supreme Court 2476; State v. Grota, 591 P. 2d 1354 and State v.
Shamblin, 763 P.2d 425 (Utah Ct.App 1988).

The police officer

was asked at the suppression hearing:
Q: And so you do not know whether at the
time of this arrest you where authorized by
any department policies, supervisors, county
attorney or anybody else to conduct searches
of sealed containers is that correct?
A: Well there is a couple of court rulings
on it yes.
Q: I am not asking for court rulings I am
asking for your guidelines?
A:

I don't have any guidelines no.

Q:

So you did this on your own?

A:

I did it on my own.

Q:

No guidelines came into place?

A:

That is correct.

Q: Okay just so I feel like we have covered
everything we are not talking about this
evidence being found in plain view was in a
locked trunk that you opened with a key and
so you had a sealed container isn't that
correct?
A:

That is correct.

The situation presented

(T. 36)
is not unlike the situation in

United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970), in which a
unanimous Court held that the proper course of action, given
probable cause to search packages placed in the mails, was to
withhold routing and delivery of the packages for the brief
period necessary to obtain a search warrant.

Rather,

the

traditional

Fourth Amendment

Lore must be

applied, which is "that the police must, whenever practicable
obtain advance

judicial

approval

of searches and seizures."

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Indeed, the doctrine annunciated in Chambers

and White

begs

the very question to be answered by the Court in this case, that
is,

whether

the

officer

was

justified

in

conducting

a

warrantless search of the vehicle at the time of the stop.
Again, the general rule stands that "warrantless searches are
unreasonable

per

se

unless

they

fall

within

a

recognized

exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment."
AVAILABILITY OF TELEPHONIC SEARCH WARRANT:
Respondent has failed to address the availability of a
radio or telephonic search warrant, stating instead that State
v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1987), should not apply but rather
the well

established

"automobile

exception"

standard

should

apply.
The police officer in this case testified that he knew that
he could obtain a search warrant by radio or telephone, and that
procedure was available to him.

He testified that he just

didn't do it because he really didn't feel it was necessary
2 5-26) .

The

State

has

claimed

that

Ashe

is

(T.

factually

distinguishable from this case, and Defendant agrees.

In Ashe

exigent circumstances were present, in the present

case no

11

exigent circumstances were present as previously argued.

In

addition, the State was not only unable to prove unavailability
of a search warrant, the police officer testified that such
procedure was available to him.

He simply chose, in his own

discretion, not to use that procedure.
The State is wrong in claiming that the practicality of
obtaining a warrant is not an element of its ability to search
without a warrant.
in the Carroll

The "practicality" determination was express

doctrine, and as the United States Supreme Court

noted- "the police must, whenever practicable
judicial approval of searches and seizures."
U.S. 1 (1968) .

obtain advance

Terry v. Ohio, 392

Therefore, the warrantless search in this case

was unreasonable.
Many things have changed since the United States Supreme
Court announced the automobile exception in the case of Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
warrants were not available at that time.

Telephonic and radio
Assuming, only for

the sake of argument, that such exceptions eliminate any need
for a warrant, the elements of the automobile exception do not
apply in this case.

First it should be noted that the reasoning

in Carroll concerned the need to permit a warrantless search
"where it is not practical to secure a warrant."

While the

State relies upon the Carroll -Chambers doctrine in this case,

12

they

then

claim

that

"practicality"

is

not

a

proper

consideration.

INDEPENDENT STATE GROUNDS AND THE TELEPHONIC WARRANT:
The State further says that Defendant failed to raise or
argue the issue of independent state grounds at the trial level,
and is therefore precluded from raising the issue at this time.
A issue is properly preserved for appeal if it is raised in the
trial

Court

and

an

opportunity

to

rule

thereon

has

been

provided.
Both Federal and State consitutional grounds were raised in
Defendant's Motion to Suppress in this case.

This issue of the

telephonic search warrant and its application under Utah Law was
likewise argued to the trial Court. (See Appellant's Memorandum
in Support of Motion to Suppress; and T. 69-70).
It
opening

should

again

brief, that

be

noted,

as provided

in Appellate's

our Supreme Court has urged

that "the

government should actively encourage its law enforcement agents
to seek search warrants whenever possible and by any available
means provided by statute•"

State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255 (Utah

1987) . Justices Durham and Zimmerman urged that the prosecution
must prove unavailability of a telephone warrant.
was not opposed by the majority in Ashe

13

This theory

because they found

exigent

circumstances

which

would

lead

to

the

immediate

destruction of evidence if a search warrant were to be obtained•
POINT II
PROBABLE CAUSE TO CONDUCT A SEARCH IN THIS
CASE WAS LACKING.
Probable cause must be viewed objectively.
belief

of

the

officer

that

he

had

The subjective

probable

cause,

"while

relevant to whether probable cause existed..., does not control
the issue."

People v. Gallardo, 112 111. App. 3d 764, 68 (1st

District 1983) .

It has been held "in his actions on the night

in question, [the officer] apparently acted in good faith, but
good faith is not enough.
the

test,

the

evaporate..."

If subjective good faith alone were

protections

of

the

Fourth

Amendment

would

Murray v. State Ex Rel. Tidwell, 423 So.2d 246,

250 (Ala. Civ.App. 1982).
REFUSAL TO CONSENT:
In

support

of

his

determination

that

he

could

search

Defendants vehicle, the police officer stated that Defendant
refused consent to search his automobile and that made the
police officer suspicious (T. 14) .

However, refusal to grant

consent cannot be used as an aid in showing probable cause.
State v. Wise, 72 Or. App. 58, 695 P.2d 68, 71 n. 3.

An adverse

inference cannot be drawn at trial from refusal to consent.
Barges v.

State, 489

P.2d

130, 132

(Alaska

1971); U.S. v.

Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343, 1350-53 (9th Cir. 1978).
14

NERVOUSNESS:
The police officer
cause

was

based

on

further testified that his probable

the

Defendant's

nervousness

(T.

20) .

However, as previously briefed to this Court, nervousness is not
a proper determination to establish probable cause.

State v.

Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1988); State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935
(Utah 1988).
PROFILE:
The State urges that Defendant appeared to be traveling in
tandem with another vehicle, and that met a drug courier profile
familiar to trooper Mangelson

(Br. of Res. 9) .

However, the

police officer stated, and the county attorney argued, that
there were no profile aspects to this stop, nor that David
Barrett met

any profile.

The county

attorney

specifically

stated "there was nothing, no evidence offered that he had when
he was observing the vehicle that it met a type of profile, that
they were hispanic or those types of things that we have heard
numerous times in this Court..." (T. 61).
The State went on to say that traveling tandem was "a drug
courier practice familiar to trooper Mangelson," which is a
total misstatement of the evidence.

Trooper Mangelson testified

that in all of his years as a police officer and highway patrol
trooper, he had only had one occasion where two vehicles were
traveling together in a drug courier situation (T. 10). This is
15

in light of 20 years experience, thousands of arrests, and in
1988 alone, the trooper made 176 arrests (T. 30) . Regardless of
what the State now argues in its brief, this was not a drug
courier profile well known to officer Mangelson.
The other observations of trooper Mangelson likewise show
this to be an innocent stop.

Both Sandiford and Defendant

Barrett stated that they were not traveling together

(T. 7) .

Defendant was asked if he had any marijuana in his car and he
replied in the negative (T. 7 ) . The officer testified he didn't
smell the odor of burnt marijuana around the Barrett vehicle,
nor

was

there

any evidence

or contraband

compartment of Defendant's car (T. 24) .
of

any

criminal

activity

in

Barrett's automobile (T. 25) .

the

in the passenger

There was no evidence

passenger

compartment

of

While the prosecution argued at

the suppression hearing that the totality of circumstances would
support probable cause, the Court should see that the totality
of the circumstances indicate that Defendant was involved in no
criminal activity whatsoever.
THE ALLEGED SMELL OF RAW MARIJUANA:
The
justified

State

argues

because

the

the

search

trooper

of

Barrett's

allegedly

smelled

vehicle

was

marijuana.

However, it should be noted that at the suppression hearing the
police officer testified that he did not know that Defendant
possessed marijuana

(T. 23) and that he thought the smell of
16

marijuana could have been coming from Sandiford's automobile (T.
21) .
The State now claims that trooper Mangelson "did not unpack
the marijuana from the front vehicle, and no testimony exists
stating that he did unpack the marijuana."

(Br. of Res. 6). As

provided in Appellant's reply to the State's facts, the trooper
testified at the suppression hearing that he opened Sandiford's
trunk, and opened the package in the trunk until he got to the
marijuana, and when he

first approached

David

Barrett, the

Sandiford trunk was open and the marijuana bag was open and on
the road. (Supra at 3; T. 20-21).
While the State argues some with the packaging and odor
suppression contained in the bundled marijuana, there is simply
no dispute that the marijuana was packaged inside six layers of
plastic, with baking soda, which was packaged inside the large
duffel bag (T. 50).

Defendant testified "I couldn't smell it.

I couldn't smell it when we took it Wyoming and it was sitting
right in my lap on the plane."
The

findings

of

(T. 51).

fact by the trial

Court

included

the

statement "the air was filled with the smell of marijuana..."
(T. 83). If the air was filled with the smell of marijuana then
it must have come from the 601bs. of marijuana on the road next
to the Sandiford vehicle.

To accept the conclusion that the

marijuana was contained in the Barrett automobile simply exceeds
17

the bounds of human reason.

The police officer had stated the

he did not know Barrett possessed marijuana and that he thought
the smell of marijuana may have been coming from the Sandiford
vehicle.

The State cites this Court to State v. Bartlev, 124

Ut.Adv.Rep. 40 and sets forth the three prong test established
by this Court.

One of those elements is that the object could

be plainly smelled.
"rank in odor."

Under the facts of Bartlev, drip gas is

Although the odor of drip gas was considered in

Bartley, many factors added into the probable cause of that stop
and search, including recent thefts of drip gas in the area; the
late hours; the infrequently traveled roads; report of potential
theft activity by those with knowledge of legal gas transfers;
the presence of trucks with empty tanks headed into the area;
the transportation of drip gas by a typical means; the lack of a
retail market for the sale drip gas; and the fact that the
vehicles when seen were "lugged down and moving slowing as if
heavily laden."

The rank and unique odor of drip gas was only

an element of the probable cause in that case.
The State goes on to cite several cases wherein the smell
of raw, rather than burned marijuana constituted probable cause
for a warrantless search and seizure.
States v.

Johnson,

497 F.2d

397

The State cites United

(1974), however the State

neglects to mention that the issue in the Johnson case was the
reasonable expectation of privacy in Johnson's luggage.
18

The

State cites several other cases, wherein

raw marijuana was

smelled, all of which are border search cases.

Since all of

these cases have in common that they were border patrol cases,
the following quote is appropriate which is taken from the case
of United States v. Ravera, 595 F.2d 1095, 1097-98 (1979), which
has been cited so favorably by the State.
At the outset, we note that customs patrol
officers are not, "like local or state
police, general guardians of the public
peace." United States v. Jackson, 423 F.2d
506, 508 (9th Cir. 1970).Customs agents are
authorized to prevent the importation of
aliens and contraband into the United
States.
See United States v. Soria, 519
F.2d 1060, 1062 (5th Cir. 1975). Congress
has granted
customs officials broad
statutory authority to stop and search
vehicles for aliens and contraband. See 19
U.S.C. §482, 1581, 1582 (1976).
If this Court validates the search of David Barrett on
these

flimsy

encourages
nullify

our

and

law

specious grounds, this Court endorses and

enforcement

activity

constitutional

and

protections

action
against

which

will

unreasonable

search and seizure.
CONCLUSION
The warrantless search of David Barrett's vehicle does not
come within

the automobile

requirement.

No exigent

exception to the search warrant

circumstances were present

several grounds stated to this Court.

on the

Barrett could have been

seized, the automobile could have been seized, or the police
19

officer

could

have

obtained

a

telephonic

or

radio

search

warrant.
A

telephonic

or

radio

search warrant

would

provide a

reasonable and proper means to check the unfettered discretion
of police officers in the field.

The officer testified that

obtaining a warrant in such a way would be available to him, and
therefore it was not impractical nor unreasonable.

This Court

should endorse the concept that a search warrant should be
obtained

if practical and that if not so done the evidence

should be suppressed.
Finally, the probable cause giving rise to this search is
insufficient.

Should this Court hold otherwise, it will license

and encourage the rampant and unfettered abuse of the public
rights

against

police officers

unreasonable
in the

search

field.

and

seizure

Indeed, based

by

maverick

on the facts

supporting this search, and those elements recognized by law,
there was no more than a slight possibility

of discovering

marijuana in Defendant's vehicle.
The

evidence

discovered

in the unreasonable

search

of

Defendant's vehicle should be suppressed and this case should be
remanded to the trial Court for further proceedings.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /?- day of March, 1990.

JAMEjS^G. CLARK
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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EXHIBIT 1

JAMES G. CLARK, USB #3637
Attorney for
96 East 100 South
Provo, UT 84606
Telephone: (801) 375-6092
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR JUAB COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH,

SUPPLEMENTARY DESIGNATION
OF RECORD ON APPEAL

Plaintiff,
vs.
DAVID LEE BARRETT,

Case No.

Defendant.

Judge:

182-D

Boyd L. Park

f
TO THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT:
This case is currently on appeal before the Utah Court of
Appeals.

The Record in the case has been transmitted to the

Court of Appeals, but upon review of that Record, some items are
missing.
Please prepare

and designate

a Supplementary

Record on

Appeal in this case and enclose to the Utah Court of Appeals
copies of the photographs admitted

into evidence during the

Suppression hearing which was held in this case.

If you have

any questions, please feel free to contact me.
DATED AND SIGNED this 2$-* day of February, 1990.

4f**

,.r

JAMEjf G. CLARK
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF HAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Supplementary Designation of Record on Appeal,
postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
David B. Thompson
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Utah Court of Appeals
400 Midtown Plaza
230 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
DATED AND SIGNED this ^fS^dav of February, 1990.
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